Introduction to China’s Laogai
 
 
 
    By their nature, all totalitarian political systems will establish a repressive mechanism aimed at eliminating political dissent and consolidating their power so that absolute control may be maintained. From ancient to modem times, history provides us with no exceptions to this rule. Two examples from this century illustrate this point: the concentration camps run by the Nazi Party in Hitler’s Germany and the gulag system in Stalin’s Soviet Union. Both systems resulted from the actions of party leaders operating within a single ideology, catalyzed by the will of a single leader.
 
    The Laogai camps were established by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong. The Laogai has outlived Mao, just as the Soviet gulag continued long after Stalin’s death. The Laogai, like the gulag, has continued as an instrument of Party rule. The gulag only ended when the Soviet Union itself collapsed.
 
    Despite many societal advances in the People’s Republic of China, the dictators in Beijing continue to depend upon its Laogai system as a tool for suppression. Far from abandoning it, the Chinese Communist party is constantly strengthening its forced labor system.
 
"Laogai," "Prison" and the Chinese Communist Party: A Lesson in Semantics
 
    A Mandarin term, "Laogai" translates literally as "reform-through-labor," but within China, the term has come to have a wider, colloquial meaning. There, the word - no matter the context in which it is uttered - can strike fear in the hearts and minds of average Chinese. Almost everyone in China is related to or knows someone who has served a lengthy sentence in a Laogai camp. Millions know people who simply disappeared into the camps, never to be heard from again.
 
    Whether individuals are thrown into a prison (jianyu), reform-through-labor camp (laogai dui) reeducation-through-labor camp (laojiao suo) juvenile offender facility (shaoguan suo), a psychiatric hospital run by the PSB, a county detention center (kanshou suo) or are those inmates who have finished their sentences but are forced to remain in the camps as forced job placement (qiang zhi jiu ye) workers, they are deprived of their freedom. They are prisoners by any common-sense definition. It is only with rare exception that these prisoners - no matter the pretext for their incarceration - are not forced to labor against their will.
 
    When it appears in this Handbook, the term Laogai encompasses all forms of imprisonment used by China’s Public Security Bureau (PSB), Ministry of Justice and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The CCP maintains complete control over all of these entities, and uses them to sustain its power.
 
    The camps are also an integral part of China’s national economy. Since the establishment of Deng Xiaoping’s so-called "open" China and the expansion of China export economy, the state organs of repression have sought to operate the Laogai at a profit.
China is not, after all, a nation of laws. It is run by the Chinese Communist Party, which interprets China’s constitution and legal codes in an arbitrary manner, allowing it to maintain its monopoly on power. The men and women who run the CCP still profess allegiance to the party even if they no longer believe in communism as a political philosophy. Such men are heirs to the founders of the Laogai. They still operate it for the same purpose: to control the population and maintain power.
 
    Following the publication of Harry Wus first book Laogai: The Chinese Gulag, in 1992, the international community began to look upon the Laogai with increasing attention and concern. Alarmed by the new international attention to the Laogai, and especially the comparisons between it and the Soviet Union’s gulag system, the Beijing government took the unusual step of issuing an official White Paper to serve as a formal response to the questions raised about the Laogai.
 
    This report, titled "On Criminal Reform" sought to create the impression that the Laogai is simply a prison system for detaining, punishing and reforming convicted criminals, and that it is no different than prison systems in other countries. The report went so far as to contend that the Laogai could serve as a model for all other countries seeking to transform bad elements into productive citizens. Since the release of "On Criminal Reform," actual events and first-hand accounts of the cruelties of the Laogai have made the words of this report ring hollow.
 
    Most Laogai camps have two names: a public name (usually an enterprise name), and an internal administrative name (usually a number). "Hangzhou Wulin Machine Works," for example, is one of the public names for the Zhejiang Province No. 4 Prison. The Foundation has endeavored in this Handbook to provide both names in the same entry whenever such information is known. The possibility exists, however, that the Handbook may list two entries for the same camp: one that only has a public name and the other a camp number. The reason for this is that the Foundation has not yet gathered evidence that definitively proves that the two are in fact the same camp.
 
The Semantics of "Reeducation-through Labor" (Laodong Jiaoyang)
 
    The Laogai institution known as laodong jiaoyang --- commonly abbreviated as
"Laojiao" - also serves as a tool for the Chinese Communist Party in its constant efforts to silence critics and punish political criminals without having to bother with investigations and legal proceedings.
 
    According to a 1982 Chinese State Council circular to the Public Security Bureau titled "Measures for Reeducation through Labor," Laojiao is an "administrative action for carrying out strict education and reform." This allows the Public Security Bureau to detain and sentence individuals for up to three years without any legal proceedings. Because placing a person in Laojiao is not a "legal action," but rather an "administrative action," Laojiao camps are therefore not included in any official accounting of the number of prisoners in the Laogai system. By the same logic, those in Laojiao camps are not considered convicted prisoners and, as such, are not covered under international treaties for treatment of prisoners, nor are the goods they are forced to manufacture covered by the bilateral agreements between the American and Chinese governments banning the trade in ‘forced labor products."
Under the amendments to the "Measures for Reeducation through Labor," suspects that are punishable by Laojiao include "counter-revolutionary elements, anti-party and anti-socialist elements." Clearly Laojiao camps have a political function. Dissidents who end up in Laojiao camps can be subjected to thought reform and forced to labor for up to three years without trial.
 
    In subsequent publicly issued copies of this document, the language about political dissidents being subject to sentencing in Laojiao camps is deleted. Nevertheless, it is clear that Laojiao--with its complete bypassing of the trial process--is still a common and arbitrarily used tool for the Beijing government in its systematic efforts to eliminate dissent. In fact, evidence exists that Laojiao facility construction has increased recently, as it has proved to be an effective muzzle on many individuals deemed hostile by the dictators.
 
"There is an end to Laogai, but Jiuye (forced job placement) is forever"
 
    In 1979 and 1980, many jiuye renyuan or ‘forced-job-placement-personnel" who had completed their sentences but were still forced to labor within the Laogai camps under a policy that denied their release, were finally allowed to return to their homes. Previous to this change in practice, upwards of 90 percent of all Laogai and Laojiao prisoners remained in detention indefinitely under this Jiuye policy even after they had completed their sentences.
 
    There used to be a saying in the labor camps: "There is an end to Laogai, but Jiuye is forever."
 
    Following Central Party decisions in 1981 and 1983, however, the Jiuye policy was put into practice once again. According to these documents, "Laogai prisoners or those who had served their sentences who had not reformed fully are to be kept in the camps for Jiuye" ("Decisions on Handling Escapees and Recidivists Who Are Under Reform through Labor or Reeducation through Labor," adopted by the 19th session of the 5th National People’s Congress Standing Committee, June 10, 1981). This broad definition has been indiscriminately applied to countless prisoners who had finished their terms in the Laogai, but were denied their freedom to return home and were forced to continue laboring in the camps.
   
    Chinese documents also state that all "counter-revolutionary criminals" are subject to "unconditional Jiuye." This policy demonstrates clearly that the Chinese government employs Jiuye to maintain control over dissidents.
 
The Numbers Game
 
    The Laogai Research Foundation does not know definitively how many Laogai camps existed at the height of Mao’s power, how many still exist, where they all were and still are, how many have suffered within them, how many died or how many are still there. Nor are the details clear about past and present living conditions in the camps, the forms of punishment and human rights violations to which prisoners are subjected. These are all considered state secrets by the CCP, which steadfastly refuses to grant the International Committee of the Red Cross access to the camps.
 
    This is the fifth edition of the Laogai Handbook. Despite new information gathered during 1997, the Foundation realizes that this work represents only a modest beginning. . The Handbook represents the pooling of information from hundreds of public and in e internal Chinese government publications, visits to Laogai camps by Laogai Research Foundation staff and testimonials by many camp survivors.
 
    Given the elusive nature of he subject matter, some information presented in the Laogai Handbook may be incorrect and need further revision. With each subsequent edition, efforts to update the handbook are continuous. The Foundation files on each camp contain considerably more detail than is published in the Laogai Handbook.
 
    The Laogai Handbook contains little information concerning camps that are run by the PLA for military prisoners. This camp system is highly secretive. The Handbook likewise does not contain data on camps run by what is known as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Xinjiang Shengchan Jianshe Bingtuan a quasi-military system of camps with many civilian prisoners. (Rather than having a civilian administration, Xinjiang - dubbed an "Autonomous Region" by Beijing - is effectively governed by the PLA.) The Handbook does, however, provide substantial data on other camps located in Xinjiang.
   
    The Laogai Handbook does not contain information about the detention centers which are usually run by the PSB at the village, township and county level. A substantial number of people are held in these facilities, but they are generally not subjected to long-term incarceration. Numerous human rights abuses do, however, take place within the walls of these detention centers, which mark the starting point for many on their dark journey through the Laogai system.
 
    The Laogai Handbook also contains information about some camps that have been dismantled, merged or moved. When such changes are known to have occurred they are noted. The purpose of the Handbook is not only to provide a list of camps that are currently operating, but also to supply information facilities that no longer function as camps.
The number of prisoners in any particular camp is constantly changing. It is possible that in some instances there are more prisoners in a camp than the Handbook notes. The opposite might also be true. The numbers provided are based on the best information available at the time of publication and should be understood by the reader as a range.
 
Readers seeking further information should feel free to contact the Foundation directly.