China: End Unlawful Practice of House Arrest

Update: On October 25th, Hu Jia left Beijing under police escort for the family's hometown in Anhui Province. Police instructed him not to return to Beijing until after the 18th Party Congress in late November, and not to go online to make public statements.

(New York) – The Chinese government should end the unlawful house arrest of the prominent activist Hu Jia. In recent weeks, Hu Jia has been prevented from leaving his home for even essential functions except for getting medical care, a marked increase in the restrictions on his movement. His current period of house arrest is his longest deprivation of liberty since his release from prison in June 2011.

“The hardening of the harsh measures taken against Hu Jia may be a sign of what lies ahead for other activists as the 18th Party Congress approaches,” said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. “Unlawful house arrest is a tactic employed by a police state, not by a country that claims to be governed according to law.”

Since September 18, 2012, Hu Jia, one of China’s most prominent human rights activists and recipient of the 2008 Sakharov prize, has been prohibited by the police from leaving his home except for getting medical care. Some seven to eight domestic security police officers guard around the clock Hu Jia’s apartment in “Bobo Freedom City,” a residential block of apartment towers in Beijing’s Tongzhou District, and prevent him from going out to purchase basic necessities, visit family, or meet friends. Hu Jia is only allowed to go out, followed by police officers, to get medical treatment for a chronic liver ailment.

On September 19 police officers blocked him from leaving to visit his parents, insulting him for 40 minutes, calling him a “traitor,” and threatening him with unspecified “consequences” if he did not remove online posts that “sold out his country.” During a similar incident that took place in early September 2012, police officers physically assaulted him to prevent him from going out, injuring his elbow and chest.

Following his release in June 2011 from three-and-a-half years in prison for his human rights activism, Hu Jia continued to be a vocal rights advocate, assisting the blind legal activist Chen Guangcheng when Chen escaped from 19 months of house arrest in April 2012, and speaking out for imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo and his wife Liu Xia, who is also under house arrest. In July 2012, police refused to renew Hu’s passport and travel documents for Hong Kong and Macau, making it impossible for him to visit his wife and daughter who now reside in Hong Kong.

“House arrest has become the Chinese government’s tactic of choice to intimidate and silence dissidents,” Richardson said. “With no basis in law whatsoever, it is the embodiment of an arbitrary and politically-motivated measure.”

Other people currently living under long-term house arrests include Liu Xia, the wife of Liu Xiaobo, and Feng Zhenghu, a prominent Shanghai activist and legal advocate.

 

  • Liu Xia, who has never been charged with or convicted of any crime, has been confined at her home in Beijing since October 2010, a situation she has likened to being a “hostage of the state.” Two policewomen tasked with monitoring her have moved into her home, and guards are stationed in and around her compound. She is not allowed to go out except in police company for occasional visits to her mother and close friends, according to a recent BBC report citing a friend of the family. Every two to three months, police permit Liu Xia to visit Liu Xiaobo, who is serving an 11-year prison sentence for “inciting subversion of state power” in Heilongjiang province, nearly 500 kilometers from Beijing.

 

  • Feng Zhenghu, best known for camping out at a Japanese airport for 12 weeks in 2009 to denounce the Chinese government’s illegal refusal to allow him to re-enter the country, has been confined at his home by the police since February 2012. He is not allowed to leave home except to be taken away for police interrogations. A security detail of about two dozen policemen guard him around the clock, and police searched his home several times since February. Several officers physically assaulted him when he tried to leave his apartment to accompany his wife to a doctor on September 19.

 

The use of house arrest – or ruanjin (“soft detention”), in police parlance – often increases around occasions on which the Chinese government seeks to silence critics without attracting the international attention brought by formal detention. Past National Peoples’ Congresses, the run-up to the 2008 Olympics, and the period following the Arab Spring each brought dozens of cases of house arrest. There is no basis in Chinese law for house arrest, and it is therefore unclear to people when they will be subject to it, or when it will end, if ever. People placed under “soft detention” are subject to highly arbitrary treatment, and do not know in advance whether or not they can leave their home, shop for necessities, receive visitors, communicate by phone or internet, or even seek medical treatment. Even when they are allowed to go out, they are followed by police or made to travel in police vehicles. There is no process by which “soft detention” can be appealed.

In public and diplomatic settings the extra-judicial character of the “soft detention” regime allows the government to deny that it is imposing restrictions on individuals, as it did for years in the case of Chen Guangcheng, who spent more than 19 months imprisoned at his home in Shandong province, or as it is doing currently for Liu Xia. When asked about Liu Xia’s incommunicado house arrest on October 13, 2010, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: “I don’t know who you’re talking about and I am not aware of this matter.”

The government also uses house arrest for shorter periods of time, during what the government considers to be sensitive political periods, such as the run up to the anniversary of the June 1989 massacre, the annual National People’s Congress meetings, or the National Congress of the Communist Party, held every five years. The 18th Party Congress, which will formalize the leadership transition at the head of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese state, is due to open on November 8, 2012.

“The practice of placing prominent critics under house arrest must end,” Richardson said. “One test for the new leadership is whether they free people like Hu Jia and Liu Xia and refrain from such tactics in the future.”

 

Laogai Research Foundation
The Laogai Research Foundation (LRF) was established in 1992 by Laogai survivor, Harry Wu, to gather information on and raise public awareness of the Laogai—China's extensive system of forced-labor prison camps. LRF also works to document and publicize other systemic human rights violations in China, including executions and the harvesting of organs from executed prisoners, the coercive enforcement of China's "one-child" population control policy, and Internet censorship and surveillance. LRF serves as an authoritative source for journalists, researchers, politicians, and other human rights organizations on human rights in China generally and the Laogai and forced labor in China specifically.
Harry Wu, Founder
Laogai Museum Front Desk

Harry Wu knows firsthand the atrocious conditions of the Laogai. In 1960, Wu was imprisoned at the age of 23 for criticizing the Communist Party, and subsequently spent 19 years toiling in the factories, mines, and fields of the Laogai.

He was released in 1979 and came to the US in 1985 with just $40 in his pocket. Since then, he has traveled back to China multiple times to further invesitgate Laogai camps and continue his call for human rights in China.

Wu founded the Laogai Research Foundation in 1992 to gather information on and raise public awareness of the Chinese Laogai.

Mission
LRF's mission is to document and expose the Laogai, China's vast and brutal system of forced labor prison camps, and to promote education, advocacy, and dialogue about China's human rights issues.
History
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Museum
Laogai Museum Front Desk

The Laogai Museum is the first museum in the U.S. to directly address human rights in China. It is the hope of the Laogai Research Foundation that the Laogai Museum will preserve the memory of the Laogai's countless victims and serve to educate the public about the atrocities committed by China's Communist regime. First founded in 2008 with the support of the Yahoo! Human rights Fund, the museum reopened in its present location in 2011, becoming a place for human rights victims and advocates to reach out to a larger audience.

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Due to the suppression of free speech within China, much of the material housed within the Laogai Archives is not available to researchers in mainland China. Thus, the Laogai Archives are in a unique position to support academics, journalists, students, and activists in freely conducting research on human rights in China.

FAQ
  1. What is the Laogai?
    The Laogai is the People’s Republic of China’s prison system. The name of the system is derived from the Chinese expression, laodong gaizao (勞動改造) meaning “reform through labor”. Generally referred to as labor reform camps (勞改隊), the prison system’s structure was developed by the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong. Modeled on the Soviet Gulag, the prison forces prisoners to do hard labor and gives them “political reeducation” to reform their thoughts and behaviors. The PRC also uses the Laogai as a source of free labor for various work, from infrastructure construction and mining, to farming and manufacturing. Through a variety of prison enterprises, the Chinese government earns income off the backs of Laogai prisoners.
    The Chinese definition of the Laogai entails six components.
    • REFORM THROUGH LABOR CAMPS/BRIGADES (勞改營 OR 勞改隊)
      “Reform through labor camps or brigades” house officially convicted and sentenced criminals.
    • PRISONS (JIANYU)

      In 1994, the Chinese government stopped using the word of “laogai,” instead it restored the traditional name of jianyu (prison). But the nature of the laogai system as a tool of rerpression remains the same.
    • REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR FACILITIES (勞動教養所OR勞教所)

      “Reeducation through labor facilities” house prisoners under “administrative discipline,” meaning that they may be sentenced to up to three years of forced labor without ever having been charged or tried.
    • DETENTION CENTERS (看守所)

      Detention centers house prisoners who are awaiting trial or have gone through a trial but the sentenced prison term is less than one year. They too can be forced to labor.
    • JUVENILE OFFENDER FACILITIES (少年管教所OR少管所)

      Juvenile offender facilities house adolescent convicts or reeducation through labor detainees. In 1983, a regulation was issued that decreased the age from 16 to 14 years old at which children can be sent to reeducation through labor camps.
    • FORCED JOB PLACEMENT (留場就業)

      These facilities were for prisoners who had served out their sentences but were deemed “not completely reformed.” Such prisoners had to stay in the same prison facility, facing the same conditions, and performing the same work just as when they were formal prisoners. The CCP ceased the forced job placement system in the early 1980s.
  2. How is the Laogai different from other prison systems?
    DIFFERENCE IN PURPOSE

    Because of international attention to human rights violations in the Laogai in the early 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party has attempted to create the impression that the Laogai is only a prison system for detaining, punishing, and reforming criminals. It was for this reason that in 1994, the CCP ordered that Laogai, meaning “reform through labor,” no longer be used in government documents. Instead, the system’s institutions were to be called jianyu, “prison.” However, contrary to CCP propaganda, the Laogai is different from prison systems in other countries. Laogai inmates are forced to labor and forced to do brain wash. What is more, they are unprotected by law, including laws against torture and abuse, as can be seen in the following section “Difference in Conditions.” The Laogai system also strengthens the CCP’S control by suppressing dissent among the Chinese people. The Laogai is an integral part of China’s economy, providing an abundance of free labor for manufacturing goods sold in both domestic and international markets.
    DIFFERENCE IN CONDITIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE LAOGAI
    The conditions that persist in the Laogai constitute an additional distinction between it and other prison systems, with the Laogai perpetuating many of China’s most serious human rights abuses.

  3. Who has suffered in the Laogai?
  4. What is the political function of the Laogai system?
    Besides punishing criminals, the Laogai serves as a tool of political repression. China sentences outspoken critics of CCP policy to imprisonment in the Laogai to quell dissent. Suspects punishable by means of laogai or prison terms include the previous “anti-revolutionaries” and present-day “endangering state security” according to the Criminal Law. Suspects punishable by means of Re-education Through Labor according to the CCP’S “Measures for Reeducation through Labor (1957)” include, “counterrevolutionary and anti-socialist reactionaries, whose crimes are minor and not subject to criminal prosecution, and who have been dismissed by government offices, organizations, and enterprises, educational institutions or other units and have no way to make a living.”
    Fear and submission to CCP rule are also perpetuated by recurring “strike hard” campaigns. During these campaigns Chinese authorities implement various penalties, public trials, and previously, public executions, to intimidate its citizens and clamp down on political “crimes”. Trials and sentencing occur rapidly, and those accused of a crime are deemed guilty even before trial. It is under these circumstances that the CCP has continually silenced dissidents.
  5. What is the economic significance of the Laogai?
    Besides being important to China’s communist regime as a tool of repression, the Laogai is also an integral part of China’s economy. Chinese authorities use the millions locked in the Laogai as free labor. Totaling an estimated three to five million, they make up the world’s largest forced labor population. The CCP seeks to use the Laogai for profit.
    Forced labor is seen as another input for economic output. The deliberate application of forced labor by the Chinese government is codified in the Ministry of Justice Criminal Reform Handbook: “Laogai facilities…organize criminals in labor and production, thus creating wealth for society. Our Laogai units are both facilities of dictatorship and special enterprise.” The CCP hopes that by being forced to labor in the Laogai, prisoners will be molded into “new socialist persons.”
  6. Are Laogai goods exported?
    While much of what is produced in the Laogai is consumed domestically, Laogai-made goods also filter into foreign markets by way of third-party trading companies. Recently, rather than attempting to do business directly with foreign companies, Laogai prisons will find a government-owned trading company to act as a middleman and conceal the forced-labor origins of products from importers. Many Laogai prisons also have a second enterprise name; for example, Jinzhou Prison, where Nobel Laureate and democracy activist Liu Xiaobo is believed to be held, also operates under the name “Jinzhou Xinsheng Switch, Co.”, which it uses to market its products to foreign companies over the internet. LRF has evidence that shows Laogai goods repeatedly find their way onto American shelves, despite laws forbidding their importation. Notwithstanding the Chinese government’s claims to the contrary, the CCP encourages exporting Laogai goods.
  7. What is existing U.S. law regarding the importation of Laogai goods?
    Importing forced-labor goods to the U.S. is illegal according to section 1307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In 1992, the need to confront China about this problem led to the signing of the “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade in Prison Labor Products.” However, China still exports prison labor goods to the U.S. To promote compliance with MOU’s terms, in 1994, the U.S. and China negotiated another agreement: the “Statement of Cooperation on the 1992 MOU between the U.S. and the PRC on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade in Prison Labor Products” (SOC). The SOC defines a mechanism to ensure that China promptly cooperates with U.S. Customs on forced labor inquiries. However, China has done nothing to ensure compliance, and the U.S. never committed resources to enforce the agreement. According to the 1997 “State Department Country Reports on Human Rights,” U.S. Customs unsuccessfully pursued eight standing visitation requests, seven of which dated back to 1995. In all cases, visitation requests were refused or ignored, and allegations were denied without explanation. Cooperation was judged as “inadequate.” In State Department reports from 1999, authorities admit that the MOU has been “nearly impossible” to enforce because China has been “uncooperative.” Throughout the 1990s, only around 20 cases of forced-labor product importation were pursued under the U.S. customs ban. Since 2000, the U.S. government has not attempted to restrict the flow of Laogai goods into the country.
  8. How can I avoid buying products made in the laogai?
    Identifying goods that are made entirely or in part in the Laogai is increasingly difficult. Sub-contracting and complicated global supply chains make discerning the origins of a product daunting. For example, a U.S. clothing maker may contact a Chinese import-export company to find a Chinese plant to cheaply make its clothing. That company may then contract the account to a legitimate Chinese textile firm, which will further sub-contract a portion of the production process to a Laogai camp, where prisoners must fill quotas to earn their food rations, rather than money. Laogai prisoners, toiling in horrible conditions, may also have grown the cotton the clothes are made from. If a product is “made in China” then it is possible it could have been produced in a Laogai.
  9. Should consumers boycott goods made in China?
  10. Are organs harvested from executed prisoners in the Laogai?
  11. What is the "One Child Policy"?
  12. Why do so few know about the Laogai?
  13. What does international law say about the Laogai?
  14. Who is Harry Wu?
  15. What is the Laogai Research Foundation?