Optimists herald China’s new president, Xi Jinping, as a liberal reformer open to the prospect of relaxing censorship controls. Xi reinforced these expectations when he recognized the need for rule of law reforms and the toleration of “sharp criticism” of official policies. Unfortunately, political realities and recent events indicate that the fifth generation of Chinese leadership will remain hostile to public expression of dissent. In light of the current political environment, draconian restrictions on speech will likely persist until broader social and economic forces demand meaningful change.
Recent official campaigns demonstrate that the Chinese government remains intent on vigorously suppressing dissent. As an example, authorities beat and detained activists throughout the country in preparation for the 2013 National People’s Congress (NPC). Most notably, officials arrested and tortured Hu Jia, a prominent dissident, at the same time of Xi’s inauguration ceremony. Persecuting activists on a massive scale in order to silence opposition during a legislative session stands in stark contrast to official rhetoric touting a dedication to liberal reform. In fact, conducting a political purge on the eve of the NPC indicates that the Party remains firmly committed to using hardline tactics of violently suppressing dissent.
Protests over censorship at the Southern Weekend newspaper served as another early test for Xi. In that case, journalists staged rallies in protest of the government’s decision to block publication of a New Year’s editorial urging the government to uphold constitutional rights. In its place, authorities published an article praising Xi’s dream for China. The government blocked all references to the incident on Weibo, China’s equivalent of Twitter. Authorities also required major newspapers to publish a column condemning advocates of a freer press. Far from indicating willingness to reform, the central government subsequently declared that control over Chinese media outlets is an “unwavering principle.”
Restrictions on foreign media outlets have also increased during Xi’s term. This recent censorship push is reflected in the decision to block access to the English language broadcasts of BBC and Voice of America. Although the government has long censored BBC’s and VOC’s Chinese language broadcasts, restricting access to English language transmissions is an unusual measure that challenges optimistic appraisals of the government’s alleged commitment to reform.
Additionally, the government has recently targeted individual foreign journalists. In January, authorities refused to renew the visa of a New York Times correspondent, forcing him to leave China. The second time in a year that the government has effectively deported a foreign journalist, this move indicates that China is hardly poised to ease media restrictions. Police also detained a BBC reporter who investigated claims of government hacking operations. In an unusually public display of censorship, authorities detained Sky News correspondent Mark Stone during live broadcast coverage of the ongoing NPC. Just weeks ago, officials assaulted a German television crew reporting on the process of urbanization in Hebei Province. Such incidents suggest that authorities remain intensely hostile to journalists who investigate sensitive topics.
Legislative developments also indicate that the Party remains resistant to reform. As evidence of this, the central government recently announced that every television documentary must now pass a stricter review process before public broadcast. Additionally, the ruling Standing Committee under Xi’s nascent tenure has enacted legislation extending and reinforcing existing censorship controls. Specifically, Xi and his colleagues strengthened real-name registration requirements for Internet users and ordered Internet service providers to immediately remove and report sensitive content. Echoing Xi’s hollow calls for reform, authorities asserted that such measures were necessary in order to promote rule of law developments.
In response to these criticisms, Xi’s supporters might argue that he has simply not had enough time to implement meaningful changes. Accordingly, we should reserve judgment until after Xi has consolidated power. After all, although Xi became the Party’s General Secretary last year, he only assumed the presidency last week. This perspective, however, ignores the fact that entrenched powers have a vested interest in maintaining censorship controls.
As analysts have indicated, the majority of Xi’s colleagues on the Standing Committee are conservatives. This ruling body, which governs by consensus, is highly unlikely to enact liberal political reforms. According to Russell Leigh Moses, the dean of academics and faculty at the Beijing Center for Chinese Studies, "political restructuring is clearly on hold: Those arguing for an expansion of the Communist Party's role -- from the economy to culture, and a good deal in-between -- won their places and the present day." Moreover, David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, asserted that the government is unlikely to loosen censorship restrictions because “too many people in the system see it as a slippery slope to extinction.”
As such, even if Xi intended to relax censorship controls, absent overwhelming pressure from economic and social forces, advancing meaningful reform would prove to be a Sisyphean task. Barring broader societal change, Xi and the fifth generation of leadership will likely only increasingly censor calls for reforms that threaten their monopoly on power.
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Harry Wu knows firsthand the atrocious conditions of the Laogai. In 1960, Wu was imprisoned at the age of 23 for criticizing the Communist Party, and subsequently spent 19 years toiling in the factories, mines, and fields of the Laogai.
He was released in 1979 and came to the US in 1985 with just $40 in his pocket. Since then, he has traveled back to China multiple times to further invesitgate Laogai camps and continue his call for human rights in China.
Wu founded the Laogai Research Foundation in 1992 to gather information on and raise public awareness of the Chinese Laogai.
The Laogai Museum is the first museum in the U.S. to directly address human rights in China. It is the hope of the Laogai Research Foundation that the Laogai Museum will preserve the memory of the Laogai's countless victims and serve to educate the public about the atrocities committed by China's Communist regime. First founded in 2008 with the support of the Yahoo! Human rights Fund, the museum reopened in its present location in 2011, becoming a place for human rights victims and advocates to reach out to a larger audience.
The Laogai Research Foundation
1734 20th Street, Northwest
Washington, DC 20009
We are two blocks north of Dupont Circle Metro's North Exit on the Red Line (corner of 20th and S Streets).
Free 2-hour and metered street parking is available throughout the neighborhood.
Hours of Operation
| Monday – Friday | 10:00 AM – 06:00 PM |
| Saturday | 10:00 AM – 05:00 PM |
(202) 730-9308
laogai@laogai.org
www.laogaimuseum.org
The Laogai Archives are in the offices of the Laogai Research Foundation in Washington, DC.
Due to the suppression of free speech within China, much of the material housed within the Laogai Archives is not available to researchers in mainland China. Thus, the Laogai Archives are in a unique position to support academics, journalists, students, and activists in freely conducting research on human rights in China.
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What is the Laogai?
The Laogai is the People’s Republic of China’s prison system. The name of the system is derived from the Chinese expression, laodong gaizao (勞動改造) meaning “reform through labor”. Generally referred to as labor reform camps (勞改隊), the prison system’s structure was developed by the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong. Modeled on the Soviet Gulag, the prison forces prisoners to do hard labor and gives them “political reeducation” to reform their thoughts and behaviors. The PRC also uses the Laogai as a source of free labor for various work, from infrastructure construction and mining, to farming and manufacturing. Through a variety of prison enterprises, the Chinese government earns income off the backs of Laogai prisoners.
The Chinese definition of the Laogai entails six components.- REFORM THROUGH LABOR CAMPS/BRIGADES (勞改營 OR 勞改隊)
“Reform through labor camps or brigades” house officially convicted and sentenced criminals. - PRISONS (JIANYU)
In 1994, the Chinese government stopped using the word of “laogai,” instead it restored the traditional name of jianyu (prison). But the nature of the laogai system as a tool of rerpression remains the same. - REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR FACILITIES (勞動教養所OR勞教所)
“Reeducation through labor facilities” house prisoners under “administrative discipline,” meaning that they may be sentenced to up to three years of forced labor without ever having been charged or tried. - DETENTION CENTERS (看守所)
Detention centers house prisoners who are awaiting trial or have gone through a trial but the sentenced prison term is less than one year. They too can be forced to labor. - JUVENILE OFFENDER FACILITIES (少年管教所OR少管所)
Juvenile offender facilities house adolescent convicts or reeducation through labor detainees. In 1983, a regulation was issued that decreased the age from 16 to 14 years old at which children can be sent to reeducation through labor camps. - FORCED JOB PLACEMENT (留場就業)
These facilities were for prisoners who had served out their sentences but were deemed “not completely reformed.” Such prisoners had to stay in the same prison facility, facing the same conditions, and performing the same work just as when they were formal prisoners. The CCP ceased the forced job placement system in the early 1980s.
- REFORM THROUGH LABOR CAMPS/BRIGADES (勞改營 OR 勞改隊)
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How is the Laogai different from other prison systems?
DIFFERENCE IN PURPOSEBecause of international attention to human rights violations in the Laogai in the early 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party has attempted to create the impression that the Laogai is only a prison system for detaining, punishing, and reforming criminals. It was for this reason that in 1994, the CCP ordered that Laogai, meaning “reform through labor,” no longer be used in government documents. Instead, the system’s institutions were to be called jianyu, “prison.” However, contrary to CCP propaganda, the Laogai is different from prison systems in other countries. Laogai inmates are forced to labor and forced to do brain wash. What is more, they are unprotected by law, including laws against torture and abuse, as can be seen in the following section “Difference in Conditions.” The Laogai system also strengthens the CCP’S control by suppressing dissent among the Chinese people. The Laogai is an integral part of China’s economy, providing an abundance of free labor for manufacturing goods sold in both domestic and international markets.
DIFFERENCE IN CONDITIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE LAOGAI
The conditions that persist in the Laogai constitute an additional distinction between it and other prison systems, with the Laogai perpetuating many of China’s most serious human rights abuses. - Who has suffered in the Laogai?
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What is the political function of the Laogai system?
Besides punishing criminals, the Laogai serves as a tool of political repression. China sentences outspoken critics of CCP policy to imprisonment in the Laogai to quell dissent. Suspects punishable by means of laogai or prison terms include the previous “anti-revolutionaries” and present-day “endangering state security” according to the Criminal Law. Suspects punishable by means of Re-education Through Labor according to the CCP’S “Measures for Reeducation through Labor (1957)” include, “counterrevolutionary and anti-socialist reactionaries, whose crimes are minor and not subject to criminal prosecution, and who have been dismissed by government offices, organizations, and enterprises, educational institutions or other units and have no way to make a living.”
Fear and submission to CCP rule are also perpetuated by recurring “strike hard” campaigns. During these campaigns Chinese authorities implement various penalties, public trials, and previously, public executions, to intimidate its citizens and clamp down on political “crimes”. Trials and sentencing occur rapidly, and those accused of a crime are deemed guilty even before trial. It is under these circumstances that the CCP has continually silenced dissidents.
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What is the economic significance of the Laogai?
Besides being important to China’s communist regime as a tool of repression, the Laogai is also an integral part of China’s economy. Chinese authorities use the millions locked in the Laogai as free labor. Totaling an estimated three to five million, they make up the world’s largest forced labor population. The CCP seeks to use the Laogai for profit.
Forced labor is seen as another input for economic output. The deliberate application of forced labor by the Chinese government is codified in the Ministry of Justice Criminal Reform Handbook: “Laogai facilities…organize criminals in labor and production, thus creating wealth for society. Our Laogai units are both facilities of dictatorship and special enterprise.” The CCP hopes that by being forced to labor in the Laogai, prisoners will be molded into “new socialist persons.”
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Are Laogai goods exported?
While much of what is produced in the Laogai is consumed domestically, Laogai-made goods also filter into foreign markets by way of third-party trading companies. Recently, rather than attempting to do business directly with foreign companies, Laogai prisons will find a government-owned trading company to act as a middleman and conceal the forced-labor origins of products from importers. Many Laogai prisons also have a second enterprise name; for example, Jinzhou Prison, where Nobel Laureate and democracy activist Liu Xiaobo is believed to be held, also operates under the name “Jinzhou Xinsheng Switch, Co.”, which it uses to market its products to foreign companies over the internet. LRF has evidence that shows Laogai goods repeatedly find their way onto American shelves, despite laws forbidding their importation. Notwithstanding the Chinese government’s claims to the contrary, the CCP encourages exporting Laogai goods. -
What is existing U.S. law regarding the importation of Laogai goods?
Importing forced-labor goods to the U.S. is illegal according to section 1307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In 1992, the need to confront China about this problem led to the signing of the “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade in Prison Labor Products.” However, China still exports prison labor goods to the U.S. To promote compliance with MOU’s terms, in 1994, the U.S. and China negotiated another agreement: the “Statement of Cooperation on the 1992 MOU between the U.S. and the PRC on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade in Prison Labor Products” (SOC). The SOC defines a mechanism to ensure that China promptly cooperates with U.S. Customs on forced labor inquiries. However, China has done nothing to ensure compliance, and the U.S. never committed resources to enforce the agreement. According to the 1997 “State Department Country Reports on Human Rights,” U.S. Customs unsuccessfully pursued eight standing visitation requests, seven of which dated back to 1995. In all cases, visitation requests were refused or ignored, and allegations were denied without explanation. Cooperation was judged as “inadequate.” In State Department reports from 1999, authorities admit that the MOU has been “nearly impossible” to enforce because China has been “uncooperative.” Throughout the 1990s, only around 20 cases of forced-labor product importation were pursued under the U.S. customs ban. Since 2000, the U.S. government has not attempted to restrict the flow of Laogai goods into the country. -
How can I avoid buying products made in the laogai?
Identifying goods that are made entirely or in part in the Laogai is increasingly difficult. Sub-contracting and complicated global supply chains make discerning the origins of a product daunting. For example, a U.S. clothing maker may contact a Chinese import-export company to find a Chinese plant to cheaply make its clothing. That company may then contract the account to a legitimate Chinese textile firm, which will further sub-contract a portion of the production process to a Laogai camp, where prisoners must fill quotas to earn their food rations, rather than money. Laogai prisoners, toiling in horrible conditions, may also have grown the cotton the clothes are made from. If a product is “made in China” then it is possible it could have been produced in a Laogai. - Should consumers boycott goods made in China?
- Are organs harvested from executed prisoners in the Laogai?
- What is the "One Child Policy"?
- Why do so few know about the Laogai?
- What does international law say about the Laogai?
- Who is Harry Wu?
- What is the Laogai Research Foundation?